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Introduction

What is the purpose of the study of history? Do we study history so that we can
predict 1 the future? If so, what should we be looking for in our inquiry, which will give
us the knowledge and ability to predict the future? Many have see history as serving
this purpose. An advocate of this approach, Karl Marx, would lead us to the search and
study of inevitable laws that guide the course of history. This is the core doctrine of
historicism, which is described as,
“…an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical
prediction is their principle aim, and which assumes that this aim is
attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the
trends’ that underlie the evolution of history” (Popper, The Poverty of
Historicism, 3).
This paper is a rejection of Historicism, and its approach to history. I will use Karl
Popper to reject to the methods of Historicism on two grounds. The first being, the less
controversial objection of, there are no inevitable historical laws, like those present in
Karl Marx’s historical materialism. The second being, a more controversial objection of,
it is impossible based solely on logical reason, to make any scientific historical
prediction. After Popper made his objections to Historicism “…it is widely believed
that…(Popper)…wreaked irrevocable damage on this doctrine” (Urbach 1). Most will
agree with the first, less controversial, objection to historicism, but what about the
1

Predict in the Marxian sense of knowledgeably making truth claims about the ‘course’ and
‘rhythms’ of history and what the future holds.
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second controversial one? Is this really the case and if so, is this the desired outcome?
Do we not use a type of historical prediction every day? Isn’t historical prediction a
necessary and functional part of our everyday lives? What about the use of
counterfactuals? Counterfactuals are projections made based on the study of similar
past situations and are used frequently in policy making decisions. What is wrong with
these types of probabilistic hypotheses? I will argue that it is the case we do
pragmatically and necessarily use historical prediction on a daily basis.
Popper has done great work in his rejection of the doctrines of Historicism but, I
propose that he was overzealous and went too far in his rejections. We do not want to
completely reject to the ability to use prediction in every case. Popper was writing
when Communism was flourishing throughout the world, therefore, rightly so, he was
worried about people laying claim to knowledge of historical laws, which gives them the
power to predict the future, then abusively using this obtained power for their own
political interest. But as I stated, I feel he was to zealous in his rejection of predictions
informed through historical knowledge. Therefore, I will propose a construction of a
Semi-Popperian theory of counterfactual projection that is pragmatic, but does not
claim to be a truth or necessity, unlike the laws of Marx’s historical materialism. The
first section of this paper will focus on Popper’s rejection of historicism, namely its
appeal to historical ‘laws’ discoverable in society. In the next section, I will ask, does
Popper’s theory lead us into a position of not being able to make historically based
predictions or counterfactuals, which seems counterintuitive and unrealizable in real-
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world decision making 2. If it is the case that we do make predictions to guide future
actions then we must have an objective criterion in which we use to do so. This leads
me into my last section where I will propose a type of Semi-Popperian theory of
counterfactual projection. In doing so, I am keeping Popper’s rejection of inevitable
laws underlying history but still allowing the use of historical projection, by adding an
objective criterion that allows us to make pragmatic and non-arbitrary action guiding
projections.

Section I: Popper’s Rejection of Historicism

As stated, the first section will focus on Popper’s rejection of Historicism.
Popper is esteemed for dismantling the philosophical arguments constructed and
proposed by the fascist and communist beliefs. In his dedication of The Poverty of
Historicism Popper states, “In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or
nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws
and Historical Destiny” (Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, V). Popper was adamant
about the termination of the doctrine of Historicism because he believed that it had
given rise to some of the most evil and detrimental of dogmas. Popper felt,
“Historicism…is not just an intellectual error, of interest of professional philosophers; it
is a prime source of moral and political devastation” (Passmore 1). This was exactly
what Marx wanted, not in the negative sense that Popper paints but in a positive sense,
2

On the individual everyday scale and the collective scale, such as, states, nations, and even
international governing bodies.
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in that, he truly believed he had found the moral and political keys to human
emancipation. Marx never desired theoretical and intellectual separatism, but sought
an engaging intellectual pragmatism. In his Theses on Feuerbach he writes,
“All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the
comprehension of this practice.…The philosophers have only interpreted
the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, Theses on
Feuerbach, 173).
Marx sincerely felt, through philosophical and historical research, he could lay bare
historical laws that could be intellectually understood, and used to predict the future
which would enable human emancipation. Popper does not attack the ends of Marx
project (emancipation) he attacks Marx’s means to the end, namely Historicism. Popper
admits there is a humanitarian appeal to the works of Marx, “…there can be no doubt of
the humanitarian impulse of Marxism….Marx made an honest attempt to apply rational
methods to the most urgent problems of social life…all modern writers are indebted to
Marx” (Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 82). Popper understood, and
identified with, the ends that Marx was trying to realize, but the problem was the
Historicist’s infected method in which Marx went about trying to achieve this end.
Now that I have briefly laid out the Historicist’s method and Popper’s attitude
towards it, I will consider the two objections that Popper offers against Historicism.
Again the definition of Historicism is, “…an approach to the social sciences which
assumes that historical prediction is their principle aim, and which assumes that this aim
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is attainable by discovering the ‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the trends’ that
underlie the evolution of history” (Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 3). The first less
controversial 3 objection is there are no inevitable historical laws guiding the course of
history in which we can know and use in historical prediction. The Historicist claims to
have discovered laws, through historical scientific research, in which he can use to
predict and know the future. Marx, as a historicist, claims to have discovered “the
history” that we should study to enable the unearthing of the hidden “laws” of this
history. In The Communist Manifesto Marx states, “The history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of class struggles” (Marx, The Communist Manifesto, 246). This is
history for Marx. This is all that is needed for examination to understand the past, exist
in the present, and know the future. Marx account of history can be considered a
reductionist account of history 4 and is exactly what Popper objects to. Popper is
objecting to the discovery of law based on research in history by arguing that the
Historicist’s, here namely Marx, account of history is no account of history at all, but
only a selection or slice. Popper argues there is no history of mankind. He argues for

3

The stronger and weaker thesis format of Popper’s objection is put forth by Herbert Keuth in his
exposition The Philosophy of Karl Popper in which he states, “’Popper’s basic thesis says ‘that the doctrine
of a historical necessity is and will remain sheer superstition, even though it proceeds to be ‘scientific’,
and that the course of history cannot be rationally predicted’ (EH, VII, m.t.) Strictly he seems to be
advocating two theses. According to the first, weaker thesis, the – strong – statement that there are
historical laws that inevitably force a certain course of history is sheer superstition. Such a superstition
may be found in Marx’s historical materialism. According to the second, stronger thesis, the course of
history cannot be scientifically predicted at all not even by means of – weaker – probabilistic
hypotheses…he claims to defiantly refuted historicism” (200-201).
4
Popper felt that a history of mankind is an impossibility. There are a number of infinite facts to
collect and we never could do an adequate job and “What people have in mind when they speak of the
history of mankind is, rather, the history of the Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman
empires, and so on, down to our day. In other words: The speak about the history of mankind, but what
they mean, and what they have learned about in school, is the history of political power” (Popper The
Open Society and It’s Enemies, 270).
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this by showing that our description of all collected historical information, and any
information, is selective 5. He states,
“The reason why all description is selective is, roughly speaking, the
infinite wealth and variety of the possible aspects of the facts of our
world…thus we may describe as long as we like our description will
always be incomplete, a mere selection, and a small one at that, of the
facts that present themselves for description.…A concrete history of
mankind, if there were any, would have to be the history of all men. It
would have to be the history of all human hopes, struggles, and
sufferings. For there is no one man more important than any other.
Clearly, this concrete history cannot be written. We must make
abstractions, we must neglect, select” (Popper, The Open Society and its
Enemies, 261,270).
Popper continues with the claim that the generalizing sciences 6 search for general laws,
in which, to construct theories to use as a frame for their research. But in the historical
sciences there are no general laws which can be used to construct general theories that
5

A similar objection comes from Dr. Kamolnick, professor of sociology, in which, he states
concerning Marx’s reductionist account of history, “Marx’s presents an extremely reductionist account of
history – ‘the history of all hitherto existing history is the history of class struggle’. This massive inflation
of class struggle and diminution of other potentially relevant variables, e.g. sex human reproductive
sexuality, race, ethnicity, and religion; geography and climate; nationalism; other sources of human
conflict, violence, war, and territorial motivation, renders Marx’s theory incapable of capturing many of
the actual social dynamics of the contemporary world” (Marx’s Theory of Social Change, 4). This is not in
support of Popper’s idea of selectivism, but does serve to show the poverty of the Historicist reductionist
theory.
6
Popper makes the distinction between generalizing sciences and historical sciences. For Popper
the historical sciences “…have…interest in specific events and in their explanation may, in contradiction to
the generalizing sciences, be called the historical science….Generalization belongs simply to a different
line of interest, sharply to be distinguished for that interest in specific events and their causal explanation
which is the business of history” (Popper, Open Society and its Enemies, 264).
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can be used to choose and organize facts. Popper explains we do use points of view to
organize facts, which might resemble universal laws, like economics, politics, or class
struggle but these are not universal laws but are the problems, issues, or themes that
we see history through. Looking at history through a point of view is inevitable, as
Popper himself states,
“A point of view is inevitable; and the naïve attempt to avoid it can only
lead to self-deception, and to the uncritical application of an unconscious
point of view. All this is true, most emphatically, in the case of historical
description, with its infinite subject matter….Thus in history no less than
in science, we cannot avoid a point of view; and the belief that we can
must lead to self deception and to lack of critical care” (Popper, The Open
Society and its Enemies Vol. II, 261).
Therefore, in concern to Popper’s first objection to historicism, we have seen that there
are no historical laws to be uncovered through the study of history. Popper’s objection
is based on the critique of the Historicist’s account of history, specifically Marx, and his
history of mankind, which is, the history of class struggle. Popper objects by showing
that all compiled and sought out histories of mankind are selections. They are inevitably
selections because of the infinite wealth of information, number of aspects, and
interpretations while doing historical research. Secondly, there may be ways in which
we formulate or structure our study of history but these are not laws, as found in the
generalizing sciences, but they are simply points of view. Man will always have a point
of view when approaching the study of history. The point is not to terminate or escape
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that point of view, which Popper would say is impossible, but to realize that there is a
point of view and proceed to study history in that fashion. The problem lies with those
who claim not have a selective point of view and therefore claim they have discovered
the history of mankind and seek to derive laws from this history. In other words, the
Historicist blindly proceeds making grandiose predictions and calling people to act based
on those predictions. The Historicist unwillingness to realize that they will always have a
point of view and will have never have considered the whole of history, sets him up for
narrow-mindedness and disaster. This is popper’s first, less controversial, objection to
Historicism, next I shall proceed to the second more controversial objection.
In his second claim Popper states that the course of history cannot be
scientifically predicted at all. Not only are there no laws or patterns guiding the course
of history but actually we cannot scientifically predict anything in the future based on
historical knowledge. He claims, “I have shown that, for strictly logical reasons, it is
impossible for us to predict the future course of history” (Popper, The Poverty of
Historicism, IX). His argument is as follows:
(1)

“The course of human history is strongly influenced by the
growth of human knowledge. (The truth of this premise must be
admitted even by those who see in our ideas, including our
scientific ideas, merely the by-products of material developments
if some kind or other.)
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(2)

We cannot predict, by rational or scientific methods, the future
growth of our scientific knowledge. (This assertion can be logically
proved…)

(3)

We cannot, therefore, predict the future course of human history.

(4)

This means that we must reject the possibility of a theoretical
history; that is to say, of a historical social science that would
correspond to theoretical physics. There can be no scientific
theory of historical development serving as a basis for historical
prediction.

(5)

The fundamental aim of historicist methods is therefore
misconceived; and historicism collapses” (Popper, Poverty of
Historicism, IX,X)

The key lies in claim number two. Popper goes on to say, “If there is such a thing as
growing human knowledge, then we cannot anticipate today what we shall know only
tomorrow” (Popper, Poverty of Historicism, X). In other words, our knowledge is
continuing to grow so theories that claim they have arrived at the end result of our
knowledge or history are impossible. We are not static factors like in a chemistry
experiment which that can be controlled and measured, are knowledge is dynamic and
is growing and changing daily. But Popper does state that not all prediction is ruled out,
“…it only refutes the possibility of predicting historical developments to the extent to
which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge” (Popper, Poverty of
Historicism, X). He does say his argument “…is perfectly compatible with the possibility
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of testing social theories – for example, economic theories – by way of predicting that
certain developments will take place under certain conditions” (Popper, Poverty of
Historicism, X). But he feels,
“…if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge, then we cannot
anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow…no scientific
predictor – whether a human scientist or a calculating machine – can
possibility predict, by scientific methods, its own future results. Attempts
to do so can attain their result only after an event, when it is too late for
a prediction; they can attain their results only after the prediction has
turned into a retrodiction” (Popper Poverty of Historicism, XI).
Popper is making the strong claim that we are not able to make any claims about the
future that involve things that would be affected by our knowledge. This claim is
coming from his continued rejection of historical prediction. He claims that social
systems are dynamic and we cannot know the future change they will go through, and
we cannot use future prediction based upon them because they need to be static in
order to do that. He explains his point by using the solar system;
“The point of considerable importance in connection with the claims of
Historicism, in so far as the success of the long term predictions of
astronomy depends entirely on this repetitive, and in the sociologist’s
sense static, character of the solar system – on the fact that we may here
and symptoms of a historical development. It is therefore certainly a
mistake to suppose that these dynamic long term predictions of a
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stationary system establish the possibility of large-scale historical
prophecies of non-stationary social systems” (Popper Poverty of
Historicism, 113)
We cannot use our current knowledge to predict the future of social systems because
they are not static like the solar system in astronomy. Our social systems are continuing
to morph and develop along with our knowledge therefore, it is impossible to predict
historical developments to the extent which they may be influenced by the growth of
our knowledge. As humans, we are the actors in the social systems and we cause it to
morph and develop because of our growing knowledge. In light of this, if we reflect
back to Marx we can see the stark contrast and disagreement between him and Popper.
Marx tried to gain a holistic knowledge of history by reducing it down to the struggles of
social classes, so that, he could claim this knowledge and use it to predict the future
direction of human social and political progression. Popper disagrees with him on two
points. First, Marx’s reductionist account of history is a wrong and incomplete
understanding of what history is and secondly, we cannot doing any predicting in
concern to things which are effected by our growing knowledge, therefore we cannot
make social and political predictions because these systems are not static and will be
greatly affected by our knowledge in the future.
In conclusion of the first section, I hoped to have sufficiently explained Popper’s
refutation Historicism through one of its key proponents, Karl Marx. Popper understood
that Marx had the noble goal of human emancipation and credits Marx for some of his
work but completely rejects the methods in which he employs. Popper rejects Marx on
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two grounds. The first is the rejection of discoverable historical laws or keys that can be
used to predict and wholly know the future. The second is a rejection of any future
prediction of social systems and their growth, except for those with controllable factors,
because they are affected by our growing knowledge which makes them dynamic and
evolving. Popper completely dismantles Marx’s proposition of discoverable laws but his
second argument, in which he employs against Historicism, is a bit more controversial
and possibly false. In the next section, I will take a closer look at Popper’s second claim
and will look at possible examples of pragmatic social predictions based on past
historical knowledge.

Section II: Examples of Valid Historically Based Predictions

As stated earlier, according to Popper we cannot do any predicting in concern to
things which are affected by our growing knowledge, therefore we cannot make
predictions because these systems will be greatly affected by our knowledge in the
future. So, we should not make historically informed decisions, but we do it all the time,
specifically when nation states and other governing bodies make policies and militaristic
decisions. It even seems that we use historical prediction every day when encountering
the most basic of situations and problems. In others words, it seems that historically
based prediction is an extremely pragmatic and functional part of human reasoning and
life. In this section, I will look at some simple examples of historically informed
predictions and also some more complex examples. It is the job of this section to
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demonstrate how we do use historical prediction and show that it is a necessary,
pragmatic, and functional part of human reasoning.
There are many areas that we use historically informed prediction but the
specific type of prediction I will consider is the use of counterfactuals. Counterfactuals
can be described as, the tendency we have to imagine or predict future possible
outcomes to an event rather than the actual outcome. Take for example the event of a
car accident. A person involved in such an accident could think of an array of different
possibilities to have avoided the accident such as; what if I wasn’t speeding in the rain
then my car would not have skidded off the road. Therefore, the next time that person
approaches the same curvy and rainy driving situation they will use their past
counterfactual thinking to prevent the event from happening again. This is a necessary
and functional part of human life. Another simple example would be someone getting
fired from their job. After the fact, one could think of many ways in which to avoid
being fired, such as, what if I had not been late; what if I had not said those things to my
boss; what if I had meet that deadline for the numbers my boss wanted? People use
these experiences and thought experiments to better plan and predict for analogous
situations in the future. Counterfactuals are a type of historically informed prediction
which benefits us. But according to Popper, this would be a logically invalid course of
reason, as shown above, due to the inevitability of the growth of future knowledge,
which would be an unaccounted variable in the predicted outcome.
Keeping this in mind I would like to consider some more complex counterfactual
examples which by their exploration and implementation seem to be beneficial to us.
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Secondly, I will consider some counterfactual examples considering international
security choices. The first example I would like to consider is a study entitled, The
Future of Human Life Expectancy: Have We Reached the Ceiling or is the Sky the Limit. In
this study the researchers are seeking to understand, by the study of history, what the
future life expectancy of humans will be and to place confidence bounds around it.
They state,
“Nonetheless, a full understanding of the forces driving mortality decline
still eludes us, and the future path of technophysio evolution is uncertain.
The goal of modern mortality forecasting is not only to identify
underlying age patterns and trends, but also to quantify this
uncertainty—to place confidence bounds around it” (Sonnega 3).
Here we see the goal of historical prediction is forecasting, predicting, and to place
confidence bounds around the future, particularly in this study the future of life
expectancy. Also they use counterfactual assumptions based on the research of
historical data. They state, “Based on historical trends, the model assumes that the
aggregate effect of all the factors that have shaped mortality in the past will continue at
the same rate in the future” (Sonnega 2). Also the article shows the possible benefits of
such research, as it states,
“Support for this type of research is increasingly important, since
improved projections of life expectancy—which give us some idea of the
future size of the elderly population—are key in informed planning for
the allocation of public and private resources” (Sonnega 1).
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As we can see through this example there are explicit uses of historical information in
order to produce counterfactual research, which, can be used for the benefit of
humanity. Popper would object to this research on two grounds; 1.) More factors than
the ones considered can be taken into account, like the possibility of war, lack of
resources, natural disasters and more, in other words it is a reductionist account. 2.)
The article is also making historically informed predictions. Popper claims we are unable
to do this, correctly, because we do not know the growth of human knowledge in the
future, which could lead us to things such as a cure for cancer or for the HIV virus. Even
in light of Popper’s points it still seems beneficial for mankind for this type of research
and prediction to be carried out.
Secondly, I would like to consider another example of counterfactual historically
based prediction. The example entails the international reality of the necessary defense
of nations through militaristic action. The example I consider comes from the book,
China: Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise.
In the beginning the author, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for
China during the Clinton administration, plays out the situation where a Chinese and
Taiwanese jet fighter crashed into each other and she considers the ramifications
between China, Taiwan, and the United States.
“’The Pentagon just informed that a Chinese SU-27 jet fighter and a
Taiwanese F-16 jet fighter have collided in the Taiwan Strait.’ My heart
sinks. I have heard that the military aircraft patrolling the narrow body of
water between the island of the Taiwan and the Chinese mainland fly
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dangerously close to one another, despite U.S. warning to both sides.
‘What about the pilots?’ I ask. ‘Have they bailed out? Been rescued?’
‘We don’t know yet,’ says the Op Center voice. ‘Has either side made a
public statement? Or communicated with us? Have we seen any military
from either side?’ ‘No information yet, ma’am. But CNN is just reporting
it now.’ I dash to my car and speed back to the state department, using
the moments calm before entering the storm of the crisis to make a plan.
What should our government do to prevent the accident triggering a war
between China and Taiwan – and vey likely drawing in the United States?
I play through various scenarios, and they all have one common thread. If
CNN is broadcasting the news of the crash, it is sure to be picked up and
spread by the interest in China before the Communist Party censors can
block it out. And once the news is public, China’s leaders will feel
compelled by the pressure of public opinion to react forcefully.
(Author speaking) Envisioning the scenario as it unfolds, when I reach my
office in the State Department, I learn that president Hu Jintao has
already appeared on China Central Television:…
Following the pattern of previous crises, the Chinese leaders have
immediately framed the situation as an international attack on China and
boxed themselves in a corner. Now how will they prove their
determination to defend the national honor against this “deliberate
provocation?”…After consulting with the secretary of state, I call the
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National Security Council staff. We agree that the president should
immediately telephone China’s president to urge him not to mobilize the
military or to make any public threats against Taiwan. Forget about
using the Foreign Ministry channel. We have to get straight to China’s
top leader, who will be feeling the heat internationally as well as
domestically. And only our president can reach their president. For our
part we will intercede with the Taiwan government and ask it not to
mobilize its military forces and to return the Mainland crew promptly. It
is too late. American Intelligence reports that China has mobilized not
only its regular military forces but also its internal security forces. Angry
Chinese students are swarming into Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and the
central squares of other Chinese cities, shouting, ‘Down with the Taiwan
separatist!’ Some in the crowds carry hastily made signs saying, ‘Down
with the American-loving Chinese Communist Party toadies!’ and ‘When
will China finally stand up?’” (Shirk 1-3).
The author states, “The scene is hypothetical, but it is not a fantasy. Crises like this have
happened in the past and can happen in the future” (Shirk 3). The situation is
counterfactual, in that, it did not actually happen, but it has in the past and could in the
future where she is considering the possible outcomes. Her book is filled with
hypothetical situation similar to this one. She considers another concerning the struggle
of North and South Korea, plus China and the United States unavoidable involvement in
the possible conflict. These scenes are extremely hypothetical and non-factual. But
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they use language such as “based on the past” and “following the pattern of previous
crises” all of which are examples of historically informed prediction.
These types of propositions are extremely helpful and pragmatic for everyday
life and more importantly states policy making. As we have seen in the examples above,
counterfactuals can be extremely helpful when making choices and they seem to be
necessarily functional and pragmatic for human life. But just as stated earlier, this type
of counterfactual thinking and prediction is unreliable and useless according to Popper
because we do not know the possible available knowledge and circumstances cultivated
by human action. These unaccounted factors can greatly affect the ways things will
unfold in the future.
Many consider Popper a philosophical hero for demolishing the seemingly
legitimizing philosophies of many authoritarian regimes. I, along with others, do
understand Popper’s worry, as he sees the danger of authoritarian governments using
history to convince the people that based on their historical knowledge they are able to
predict the future. I feel, Popper, rightfully so, is extremely worried about people who
claim they know history and now can confidently and accurately predict future. He has
shown how this can be dangerous. People will abusively use this “historical knowledge”
as propaganda to promote their agendas and also as justifications of their agendas.
Therefore, Popper has succeeded in his attempt of destroying the core
Historicist doctrines but in doing so has left us in two camps. If we don’t agree with
Popper we are in the Historicist camp, which states we can have complete and accurate
knowledge of the future based on discoverable historical laws. Or we are in the second
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camp and embrace the claim that Popper’s arguments seem to direct us to, that we can
have no knowledge of the future therefore, we should not try to use historically based
predictions. But, as I have shown, we do use prediction as knowledge for making
decisions about the future. Therefore, the objection is raised to Popper; did he go too
far when he claimed the inability of any historically informed prediction that could be
affected by our growing human knowledge? I believe, and have tried to show that, we
can make historically informed counterfactual predictions and agree with Michael Allen
when he states, “Counterfactually-based historical predictions are inferences to the best
available explanation of what the future is likely to hold…it (counterfactually-based
historical predictions) is pragmatically action-guiding with respect to future
uncertainties” (Allen 10). Therefore, I disagree with Popper and feel it is possible and
necessary to suggest 7 counterfactual predictions based on historical experience.

Section III: Semi-Popperian Theory of Projection Making

As stated earlier, I do feel historically informed predictions are necessary,
pragmatic, and functional for humans therefore, I would like to propose a SemiPopperian theory that uses counterfactually based historical projections. Similar to
Popper, I agree that the historical laws proposed by Historicist are completely false and
unknowable. But unlike Popper, I do feel that we do, and can, functionally use historical
knowledge of past events in order to make pragmatic judgments and projections about
7

I use suggest to contrast the Historicist’s vocabulary of ‘claim’ or ‘to know.’
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the future. My theory of counterfactually based historical projections has three main
attitudes that help us to stray away from the kind of philosophy Popper was worried
about. I propose a dynamic, informative, and diverse historically informed theory of
prediction. In this section, I would like to lay out the three main attitudes of my theory.
Then I will proceed to lay out a criterion, in which, we can evaluate more or less
plausible counterfactuals which can be used as legitimate historically informed
prediction.
First, I would like to look at the dynamic aspect of my theory. It is dynamic, in
that, there is always room for flexibility and change. The theory is not concerned with
static prediction, such as, unchanging historical laws like the the Historicist uses.
Secondly, it is informative, as opposed to descriptive, because descriptive implies
knowing. We should try and be informed of future possibilities but never claim a
complete knowledge of what the future holds. This is the difference between projection
and prophecy. Thirdly, it is diverse, in that we try, as much as possible, not be
reductionist in our research. Popper does claim that no matter how hard we try we will
always have a point of view but we must proceed realizing this and never claim to have
considered all possibilities. We must begin any historically informed decision making
committed to these three attitudes. This is critical in order not to fall into the trap of
Historicism. Briefly, I would like to make some comparisons in concern to historical
determinism and my theory of counterfactually-based historical projections in order to
clearly show the differences of the theory I am proposing and Historicism. Here is a list
of the differences between the two:
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Historical Determinism

Counterfactually-Based Historical Projections

Implies Knowing

Simply Projecting

Laws (static)

Suggestions (dynamic)

Singularity

Diverse

Power

Humility/Respect

Closed

Open

Action-forcing

Action-guiding

Authoritarian

Democratic

My project now is to form a criterion based on dynamic, informative, and diverse
characteristics, with which, one can make non-arbitrary and legitimate predictions. If I
cannot do this, “then the whole exercise starts to look hopelessly subjective, circular,
and non-falsifiable. What is to stop us from simply inventing counterfactual outcomes
that justify out political bias and predilections?” (Tetlock and Belkin 38). Or I could be
left as a skeptic of historical predictions and will not be able to confidently make choices
between more or less plausible counterfactuals. Therefore, I must answer the question,
how can we objectively make choices between legitimate and not legitimate
counterfactuals? In other words, the skeptic might say, ok it is necessary that I make
future predictions but I can predict many events, which one should I choose? Based on
Poppers argument against Historicism, and the direction that it leads us, we cannot
follow an, if A then B, mindset when approaching prediction or counterfactual thinking.
Let me use an example to play this out. Let’s say that North Korea’s new supreme
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leader Kim Jong Un makes the statement, “Now that we have nuclear capabilities are
going to try and unite the Korean peninsula. We have nothing to lose and if anyone in
the international community tries to stop us we will take the necessary measures
needed to ultimately accomplish our goal!” Does it follow that he will do this (If A then
B)? If we look to history and say upon my research, YES he will do this because of the
many examples of this happening in the past (Option B). Or we could also say, no he will
not do this, these statements are just Kim Jong Un attempting to establish himself as the
new totalitarian leader of North Korean regime and this statement is just more rhetoric
of the dictatorship that we have seen from the past (Option C). Using this example we
can see that we cannot always follow the historically informed, if A then B pattern,
because of the also historically informed C option and other possible options.

If A

B

D

C

B

If A
Therefore, there needs to be an action guiding criterion, with which, we can chose the
most plausible of these counterfactual predictions. We cannot appeal to any laws of the
past, as Popper has shown us, but there must be some way that we can distinguish
between the more plausible counterfactual predictions from the less plausible ones.
Popper does not refute, as stated earlier, “the possibility of every kind of social
prediction; on the contrary, it is perfectly compatible with the possibility of testing social
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theories – for example, economic theories – by way of predicting that certain
developments will take place under certain conditions” (Popper, Poverty of Historicism,
X). But here I am not talking about social theories. I am talking about individual political
decision making, mainly the choices that we are faced with in state policy options and
militaristic courses of action.
In light of these concerns, I will now layout the criterion, with which, I feel
counterfactuals must be evaluated. In doing this, I am answering to the worry of the
skeptic who says, aren’t all counterfactuals equally valid or how can you choose
between one counterfactual over the other? In other words, how can you escape the
subjectivism of which should be used in counterfactual prediction making. While
answering the skeptics’ question one must realize that there is some room for freedom
and disagreement but “It would be a big mistake to confuse epistemic pluralism (which
we accept up to a point) with an anything-goes subjectivism (which we reject and which
would treat all counterfactual claims as equally valid in their own way)” (Tetlock and
Belkin 16).
Before I layout the four constraints I would like mention that the ideas and
formation of these constraints comes from the book Counterfactual Thought
Experiments in World Politics, and specifically the chapter by Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron
Belkin, entitled, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical,
Mythological, and Psychological Perspectives. Now, I will proceed to layout and explain
my four constraints when producing plausible counterfactuals. The first type is logical
constraints. There are two specific logical constrains that should be focused on when
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constructing counterfactuals. The first, proposes “…like actual experiments, thought
experiments should manipulate one cause at a time, thereby isolating pathways of
influence” (Tetlock and Belkin 19). The approach that I advocate is termed the “…strike
model of counterfactual inference…” (Tetlock and Belkin 20). This approach originates
from James D. Fearon. He proposes,
“As a pragmatic rule of evidence, that we seriously consider only those
counterfactuals in which the antecedent seems likely to affect the
specified consequent and very little else. This argument invokes a
surgical- strike model of counterfactual inference in which we not only
manipulate one thing at a time, we give priority attention to those causes
specifically relevant to the consequent of interest” (Tetlock and Belkin
21). 8
Therefore, just as a surgeon is concern about the objects affecting the specific interest
the counterfactual inference taken should also be only concerned with the objects
closest to interest of the antecedent and consequent. To some there is an immediate
aversion to this approach by their understanding that everything is ultimately
interconnected. In other words, every action has a result and therefore many different
results are possible even by the smallest change. But I follow the understanding of
Pattee who states,

8

This approach is also similar with Popper’s proposal of “Piecemeal Engineering” as opposed to
“Utopian Engineering.” Speaking of the piecemeal engineer, he states, “…he will make his way, step by
step carefully comparing the results expected with the results achieved, and always on the lookout for the
unavoidable unwanted consequences of any reform; and he will avoid undertaking reforms of complexity
and scope which make it impossible for him to disentangle cause and effects, and to know what he is
really doing” (Popper, Poverty of Historicism, 67).
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“Casual interconnectedness is a matter of degree…Everything is connected but some
things are more connected than others. The world is a large matrix of interactions, in
which, most of the entries are very close to zero” (Tetlock and Belkin 19). No doubt
there is a challenge of deciding which connections are stronger than others but it would
be a mistake to say that we have to construct a totally different counterfactual every
time we change a minute detail.
The second logical constraint has to do with the consistency of connecting
principles or, cotenability. Tetlock and Belkin propose three minimal criteria for which
need be satisfied, “…(first) should be specifically reasonably precisely, (second) be
consistent with one another, (third) and be consistent with both the antecedent and
consequent” (Tetlock and Belkin 21). The reality that counterfactuals tend to be
extremely complex tends to weaken the principle of contenability and therefore there is
the possibility of connecting completely wrong antecedents and consequents. But we
should not use this as an excuse for making false claims of connectedness. One example
to consider is the statement of “…if Napoleon had possessed a stealth bomber he would
have won the Battle of Waterloo” (Tetlock and Belkin 23). This is not logically
consistent, because Napoleon and stealth bomber are not logically consistent. The is no
possibility that Napoleon could have possessed a stealth bomber at the Battle of
Waterloo. Therefore we cannot proceed with any intelligible information from this
statement. So far, I have considered two constraints of the logicality of counterfactuals,
the first one being, the taking of a surgical strike approach when methodologically
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constructing counterfactuals and the second being consistency of antecedents and
consequents, or contenability.
The next category of constraint is historical constraints. When composing
counterfactuals we must follow the minimal-rewrite-of-history rule. Many scholars
have proposed,
“…in possible worlds we should: (a) start with the real world as it was
otherwise know before asserting the counterfactual; (b) not require us to
unwind the past and rewrite long stretches of history; (c) not unduly
disturb what we otherwise know about the original actors and their
beliefs and goals” (Tetlock and Belkin 23).
In other words, we should try and stick as close to history as possible. Because if we try
and rewrite an extended period of history we are faced with more chances for the
logical constraints, earlier stated, to become strained and possibly broken. Also, there
should not be an extended amount of time between two bodies of facts that we are
connecting as antecedent and consequent. Because it would be false to assume that all
other unconsidered objects would stay the same in the time gap. Therefore, based on
the above we must follow the minimal-rewrite-of-(known) 9 history rule and never allow
extended time gaps of connection.
Theoretical constraints are the next category we should consider when
producing counterfactuals. In other words,

9

Known is the sense that we stick to what is the consensus of people and their personalities and
events and their facts throughout history.
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“We need theoretical constraints on the connecting principles we use to
link antecedents and consequents. Otherwise, we cannot rule out
counterfactuals that start from reasonable antecedents but end in farfetched consequences by proposing preposterous principles of causality
such as…If North Korea had conquered South Korea in 1950, the
economy of the South would have grown even more rapidly than it
actually did because of the wisdom of the policy of self-sufficiency of the
Great Leader Kim II Sung” (Tetlock and Belkin 25).
If possible, we could follow the theoretical laws of social science, but as Popper has
shown earlier, and which there is majority consensus, these do not exist. But this does
not mean that we do not have structure in which we can ground our theoretical inquiry
of counterfactuals. There are many well-established theories in social science such as
“…theories that stress normative and institutional rules of fairness, cultural theories that
stress group values and identifications, political theories of bureaucratic and interestgroup competition, and cognitive theories of belief systems and bounded rationality”
(Tetlock and Belkin 26). In order to produce plausible counterfactuals they must be
consistent with these well-established theories.
Lastly, there must be psychological constraints to our counterfactual
productions. This one might be one of the hardest ones to monitor and correct when
we are constructing counterfactuals. Our psychological biases can greatly affect our
projection of counterfactuals, and possibly even to a detrimental state. Therefore, we
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should be extremely cautious and sensitive to the reality that we have do biases and
they,
“…can creep into every stage of this inherently subjective process, from
the initial selection of antecedents (for “mental manipulation”) to the
evaluation of connecting principles to the willingness to entertain
counterarguments and alternative scenarios. Bias appears inevitable, in
part because of the cognitive limitations and motivational inclinations of
the thinker in whose mind the thought experiment “runs,” and in part
because of the extraordinary complexity and ambiguity of the task”
(Tetlock and Belkin 21).
In light of this, one must be aware when making counterfactual projections of the
possible psychological biases. In this section, I will briefly identify some of the cognitive
and motivational biases which will help us to understand and identify them, so that we
can do our best to avoid them at all cost.
To start, I will look at a widely proposed and accepted point, that is the principle
of bounded rationality, meaning that we “…are limited-capacity information processors
who rely on low-effort strategies to simplify an otherwise intolerably complex world”
(Tetlock and Belkin 33). The same principle applies when we construct our
counterfactual thought experiments and this could possibly distort our outcomes. Many
will argue, this is the best that we can do when using human cognitive processes as
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opposed to machines which produce counterfactuals. 10 But “…the most lethal threat to
the validity of counterfactual thought experiments comes, however, from theory-driven
thinking” (Tetlock and Belkin 34). As stated earlier, well established social theories can
assist us in making and evaluating counterfactuals but by taking on these social theories
they also run the danger of losing our ability to see outside of them. This can be
detrimental to our counterfactuals, as we are trying to provide an objective and
unbiased product. Although this problem, I feel, can be solved through plural criticism
and discussion about ones produced counterfactuals. Lastly, the counterfactuals
constructor must be aware of outcome knowledge contamination. We have a tendency,
in concern to cause and affect relationships, to let the known outcome effect the
projected outcome. We must be on the guard against this, as the whole point of the
counterfactual is to project an outcome yet unrealized. In summary of the cognitive
biases, I started first with the realization of human’s simplification of cognitive processes
which can be detrimental to counterfactual outcomes. Next, I looked at the biases of
theory-driven thinking that can sometimes be hard to escape when constructing
counterfactuals. Lastly, I showed, that when producing counterfactuals we must be on
guard against outcome knowledge contamination which defeats the whole purpose of
projecting unrealized outcomes. These are a few of the major cognitive processes in
which we need to be aware in order to produce plausible counterfactuals.

10

This is a reference to counterfactual computer simulation. An overview of this process can be
found In the book I have already been working out of Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World
Politics in the chapter by Lars-Erik Cederman entitled Rerunning History by Computer.
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Secondly, in my psychological constrains, I will focus on motivational biases that
must be contained when producing counterfactuals. As hinted on earlier human are not
computers and do carry with them motivations, dreams, and aspirations. Tetlock and
Belkin lay out the four main motivational factors that tend to effect counterfactual
production,
1.) “…Needs for predictability and controllability.
2.) Needs to avoid blame and to claim credit.
3.) Needs for consolation and inspiration.
4.) Needs for cognitive consistency…” (Tetlock and Belkin 35-36).
5.) Needs of power. (I would also add this as many counterfactuals have been
maliciously constructed for the sole purpose of convincing people to act in
a certain way so that the power of a certain individual or regime would be
increased.)
These are the five factors that should be carefully monitored, and if found present they
should be controlled or eliminated. With this I conclude my section on psychological
constrains of the cognitive and motivational kind.
In conclusion of this section, I claim to have answered the skeptic’s objection of,
are not all counterfactuals subjective and equal in validity? What makes one
counterfactual more plausible than another? I have answered this objection by giving a
criterion in which to evaluate the plausibility of counterfactual projections. The
criterion consists of four areas of constraint, logical, historical, theoretical, and
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psychological. Logically, we must practice the surgical-strike method of construction
and be consistent with connecting principles of antecedent and consequent.
Historically, we must follow the minimal-rewrite-of-history rule, with which, we stick as
close to history as possible, and also there should not be excessive gaps of time
between connecting principles. Theoretically, we must be consistent with wellestablished social theories when constructing counterfactuals. And last psychologically,
we must be aware of our cognitive and motivational biases when producing
counterfactuals. With this criterion of constraint we are able to produce plausible
counterfactuals. All counterfactual are not equally plausible and must be evaluated,
criticized, and accepted upon objective criteria. In this section, I have clearly laid out a
criterion with which counterfactuals can be evaluated. I close with a claim of the need
for counterfactuals and a criterion on which to evaluated them,
“One the one hand, we acknowledge that thought experiments inevitably
play key roles in the causal arguments of any historical discipline. On the
other hand, we acknowledge that thought experiments are often
suffused with error and bias. But, that said, we do not conclude that
things are hopeless – that it is impossible to draw causal lessons from
history. Rather, we conclude that disciplined use of counterfactuals –
grounded in explicit standards for evidence and proof – can be
enlightening in specific historical, theoretical, and policy setting” (Tetlock
and Belkin 38).
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Conclusion
The use of historical prediction has been looked down upon ever since Popper
spent his energy writing against it. Popper felt that Historicism was more than just a
philosophy or dogma, and he felt that this particular doctrine was being used by many
leaders in the world to advance their own evil and selfish schemes and agendas. He was
so adamant in writing against it that I have claimed he went too far, and his rejection of
historical prediction lead us down an academic road of complete skepticism when it
comes to historically based prediction. But as I have shown, historical prediction is
useful and necessary in the human life. Therefore, it has been the project of this paper
to give back some of the confidence in historical prediction that Popper stole through
his skeptical analysis. I have done this through first, laying out Popper’s position,
particularly his position against Marx‘s historical materialism. Secondly, I have claimed
that Popper went too far and produced tremendous skepticism towards any historical
prediction, much like Descartes’ Evil Genie and the problem of skepticism it posed.
Next, I attempted to show that we do use historical prediction daily, and not only daily,
but also on a larger scale of state policy making. Using both mundane daily examples
and governing body’s policy examples, I have shown the value of historical prediction
and the great need for it. But, being consistent with Popper, when we do historical
research and prediction we must guard ourselves from falling into the trap of
Historicism by projecting possibilities in the future as opposed to predicting the future
with unchecked certainty. Lastly, I proposed a criterion in which we can evaluate our
historical research and prediction, specifically counterfactual prediction, which enables
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us to make confident selections of more or less plausible counterfactual predictions. I
believe this criterion has removed some of the skepticism that Popper created in his
critical analysis of historical prediction. Also this criterion has given us a pragmatic way,
with which, we can evaluate useful and helpful counterfactuals projections. My project
is not claiming the complete ability to study the past and know the future, but it does
give an objective criterion in order that we can be as reasonable and critical as possible
when doing our historical research and projection so that we do not fall, like many
before us, into the trap of Historicism.
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